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Abstract
We show a new lower bound on the sample complexity of (ε,δ)-differentially private
algorithms that accurately answer statistical queries on high-dimensional databases. The
novelty of our bound is that it depends optimally on the parameter δ, which loosely corre-
sponds to the probability that the algorithm fails to be private, and is the first to smoothly
interpolate between approximate differential privacy (δ > 0) and pure differential privacy
(δ = 0).
Specifically, we consider a database D ∈ {±1}n×d and its one-way marginals, which are
the d queries of the form “What fraction of individual records have the i-th bit set to +1?”
We show that in order to answer all of these queries to within error ±α (on average) while
satisfying (ε,δ)-differential privacy, it is necessary that
n ≥Ω
√d log(1/δ)αε
 ,
which is optimal up to constant factors. To prove our lower bound, we build on the con-
nection between fingerprinting codes and lower bounds in differential privacy (Bun, Ullman,
and Vadhan, STOC’14).
In addition to our lower bound, we give new purely and approximately differentially
private algorithms for answering arbitrary statistical queries that improve on the sample
complexity of the standard Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms for achieving worst-case ac-
curacy guarantees by a logarithmic factor.
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1 Introduction
The goal of privacy-preserving data analysis is to enable rich statistical analysis of a database
while protecting the privacy of individuals whose data is in the database. A formal privacy
guarantee is given by (ε,δ)-differential privacy [DMNS06, DKM+06], which ensures that no in-
dividual’s data has a significant influence on the information released about the database. The
two parameters ε and δ control the level of privacy. Very roughly, ε is an upper bound on
the amount of influence an individual’s record has on the information released and δ is the
probability that this bound fails to hold1, so the definition becomes more stringent as ε,δ→ 0.
A natural way to measure the tradeoff between privacy and utility is sample complexity—
the minimum number of records n that is sufficient in order to publicly release a given set
of statistics about the database, while achieving both differential privacy and statistical accu-
racy. Intuitively, it’s easier to achieve these two goals when n is large, as each individual’s data
will have only a small influence on the aggregate statistics of interest. Conversely, the sample
complexity n should increase as ε and δ decrease (which strengthens the privacy guarantee).
The strongest version of differential privacy, in which δ = 0, is known as pure differential
privacy. The sample complexity of achieving pure differential privacy is well known for many
settings (e.g. [HT10]). The more general case where δ > 0 is known as approximate differential
privacy, and is less well understood. Recently, Bun, Ullman, and Vadhan [BUV14] showed how
to prove strong lower bounds for approximate differential privacy that are essentially optimal
for δ ≈ 1/n, which is essentially the weakest privacy guarantee that is still meaningful.2
Since δ bounds the probability of a complete privacy breach, we would like δ to be very
small. Thus we would like to quantify the cost (in terms of sample complexity) as δ→ 0. In
this work we give lower bounds for approximately differentially private algorithms that are
nearly optimal for every choice of δ, and smoothly interpolate between pure and approximate
differential privacy.
Specifically, we consider algorithms that compute the one-way marginals of the database—an
extremely simple and fundamental family of queries. For a databaseD ∈ {±1}n×d , the d one-way
marginals are simply the mean of the bits in each of the d columns. Formally, we define
D :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Di ∈ [±1]d
where Di ∈ {±1}d is the i-th row of D. A mechanism M is said to be accurate if, on input D, its
output is “close to”D. Accuracy may be measured in a worst-case sense—i.e.
∣∣∣∣∣∣M(D)−D∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ α,
meaning every one-way marginal is answered with accuracy α—or in an average-case sense—
i.e.
∣∣∣∣∣∣M(D)−D∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤ αd, meaning the marginals are answered with average accuracy α.
Some of the earliest results in differential privacy [DN03, DN04, BDMN05, DMNS06] give a
simple (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm—the Laplace mechanism—that computes the one-
way marginals of D ∈ {±1}n×d with average error α as long as
n ≥O
min

√
d log(1/δ)
εα
,
d
εα

 . (1)
1This intuition is actually somewhat imprecise, although it is suitable for this informal discussion. See [KS08]
for a more precise semantic interpretation of (ε,δ)-differential privacy.
2When δ ≥ 1/n there are algorithms that are intuitively not private, yet satisfy (0,δ)-differential privacy.
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The previous best lower bounds are n ≥Ω(d/εα) [HT10] for pure differential privacy and n ≥
Ω˜(
√
d/εα) for approximate differential privacy with δ = o(1/n) [BUV14]. Our main result is an
optimal lower bound that combines the previous lower bounds.
Theorem 1.1 (Main Theorem). For every ε ≤ O(1), every 2−Ω(n) ≤ δ ≤ 1/n1+Ω(1) and every
α ≤ 1/10, if M : {±1}n×d → [±1]d is (ε,δ)-differentially private and E
M
[
‖M(D)−D‖1
]
≤ αd, then
n ≥Ω
√d log(1/δ)εα
 .
More generally, this is the first result showing that the sample complexity must grow by a
multiplicative factor of
√
log(1/δ) for answering any family of queries, as opposed to an additive
dependence on δ. We also remark that the assumption on the range of δ is necessary, as the
Laplace mechanism gives accuracy α and satisfies (ε,0)-differential privacy when n ≥O(d/εα).
1.1 Average-Case Versus Worst-Case Error
Our lower bound holds for mechanisms with an average-case (L1) error guarantee. Thus, it
also holds for algorithms that achieve worst-case (L∞) error guarantees. The Laplace mech-
anism gives a matching upper bound for average-case error. In many cases worst-case error
guarantees are preferrable. For worst-case error, the sample complexity of the Laplace mecha-
nism degrades by an additional logd factor compared to (1).
Surprisingly, this degradation is not necessary. We present algorithms that answer every
one-way marginal with α accuracy and improve on the sample complexity of the Laplace mech-
anism by roughly a logd factor. These algorithms demonstrate that the widely used technique
of adding independent noise to each query is suboptimal when the goal is to achieve worst-case
error guarantees.
Our algorithm for pure differential privacy satisfies the following.
Theorem 1.2. For every ε,α > 0, d ≥ 1, and n ≥ 4d/εα, there exists an efficient mechanism M :
{±1}n×d → [±1]d that is (ε,0)-differentially private and
∀D ∈ {±1}n×d P
M
[∣∣∣∣∣∣M(D)−D∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≥ α] ≤ (2e)−d .
And our algorithm for approximate differential privacy is as follows.
Theorem 1.3. For every ε,δ,α > 0, d ≥ 1, and
n ≥O
√d · log(1/δ) · loglogdεα
 ,
there exists an efficient mechanism M : {±1}n×d → [±1]d that is (ε,δ)-differentially private and
∀D ∈ {±1}n×d P
M
[∣∣∣∣∣∣M(D)−D∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≥ α] ≤ 1dω(1) .
These algorithms improve over the sample complexity of the best known mechanisms for
each privacy and accuracy guarantee by a factor of (log(d))Ω(1). Namely, the Laplace mecha-
nism requires n ≥O(d · logd/εα) samples for pure differential privacy and the Gaussian mech-
anism requires n ≥O(√d · log(1/δ) · logd/εα) samples for approximate differential privacy.
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Privacy Accuracy Type Previous bound This work
(ε,δ) L1 or L∞ Lower n = Ω˜
(√
d
αε
)
[BUV14] n =Ω
(√
d log(1/δ)
αε
)
(ε,δ) L1 Upper n =O
(√
d·log(1/δ)
εα
)
Laplace
(ε,δ) L∞ Upper n =O
(√
d·log(1/δ)·logd
εα
)
Gaussian n =O
(√
d·log(1/δ)·loglogd
εα
)
(ε,0) L1 or L∞ Lower n =Ω
(
d
αε
)
[HT10]
(ε,0) L1 Upper n =O
(
d
εα
)
Laplace
(ε,0) L∞ Upper n =O
(
d·logd
εα
)
Laplace n =O
(
d
εα
)
Figure 1: Summary of sample complexity upper and lower bounds for privately answering d
one-way marginals with accuracy α.
1.2 Techniques
Lower Bounds: Our lower bound relies on a combinatorial objected called a fingerprinting
code [BS98]. Fingerprinting codes were originally used in cryptography for watermarking digi-
tal content, but several recent works have shown they are intimately connected to lower bounds
for differential privacy and related learning problems [Ull13, BUV14, HU14, SU14]. In partic-
ular, Bun et al. [BUV14] showed that fingerprinting codes can be used to construct an attack
demonstrating that any mechanism that accurately answers one-way marginals is not differen-
tially private. Specifically, a fingerprinting code gives a distribution on individuals’ data and a
corresponding “tracer” algorithm such that, if a database is constructed from the data of a fixed
subset of the individuals, then the tracer algorithm can identify at least one of the individu-
als in that subset given only approximate answers to the one-way marginals of the database.
Specifically, their attack shows that a mechanism that satisfies (1, o(1/n))-differential privacy
requires n ≥ Ω˜(√d) samples to accurately compute one-way marginals.
Our proof uses a new, more general reduction from breaking fingerprinting codes to dif-
ferentially private data release. Specifically, our reduction uses group differential privacy. This
property states that if an algorithm is (ε,δ)-differentially private with respect to the change of
one individual’s data, then for any k, it is roughly (kε,ekεδ)-differentially private with respect
to the change of k individuals’ data. Thus an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm provides a
meaningful privacy guarantee for groups of size k ≈ log(1/δ)/ε.
To use this in our reduction, we start with a mechanism M that takes a database of n rows
and is (ε,δ)-differentially private. We design a mechanismMk that takes a database of n/k rows,
copies each of its rows k times, and uses the result as input to M. The resulting mechanism Mk
is roughly (kε,ekεδ)-differentially private. For our choice of k, these parameters will be small
enough to apply the attack of [BUV14] to obtain a lower bound on the number of samples used
by Mk , which is n/k. Thus, for larger values of k (equivalently, smaller values of δ), we obtain a
stronger lower bound. The remainder of the proof is to quantify the parameters precisely.
Upper Bounds: Our algorithm for pure differential privacy and worst-case error is an in-
stantiation of the exponential mechanism [MT07] using the L∞ norm. That is, the mechanism
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samples y ∈ Rd with probability proportional to exp(−η ∣∣∣∣∣∣y∣∣∣∣∣∣∞) and outputs M(D) = D + y. In
contrast, adding independent Laplace noise corresponds to using the exponential mechanism
with the L1 norm and adding independent Gaussian noise corresponds to using the exponen-
tial mechanism with the L2 norm squared. Using this distribution turns out to give better tail
bounds than adding independent noise.
For approximate differential privacy, we use a completely different algorithm. We start by
adding independent Gaussian noise to each marginal. However, rather than using a union
bound to show that each Gaussian error is small with high probability, we use a Chernoff
bound to show that most errors are small. Namely, with the sample complexity that we allow
M, we can ensure that all but a 1/polylog(d) fraction of the errors are small. Now we “fix”
the d/polylog(d) marginals that are bad. The trick is that we use the sparse vector algorithm,
which allows us to do indentify and fix these d/polylog(d) marginals with sample complexity
corresponding to only d/polylog(d) queries, rather than d queries.
2 Preliminaries
We define a database D ∈ {±1}n×d to be a matrix of n rows, where each row corresponds to an
individual, and each row has dimension d (consists of d binary attributes). We say that two
databases D,D ′ ∈ {±1}n×d are adjacent if they differ only by a single row, and we denote this by
D ∼ D ′. In particular, we can replace the ith row of a database D with some fixed element of
{±1}d to obtain another database D−i ∼D.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06]). Let M : {±1}n×d →R be a randomized mech-
anism. We say that M is (ε,δ)-differentially private if for every two adjacent databases D ∼ D ′
and every subset S ⊆R,
P [M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eε ·P[M(D ′) ∈ S]+ δ.
A well known fact about differential privacy is that it generalizes smoothly to databases
that differ on more than a single row. We say that two databases D,D ′ ∈ {±1}n×d are k-adjacent
if they differ by at most k rows, and we denote this by D ∼k D ′.
Fact 2.2 (Group Differential Privacy). For every k ≥ 1, if M : {±1}n×d → R is (ε,δ)-differentially
private, then for every two k-adjacent databases D ∼k D ′, and every subset S ⊆R,
P [M(D) ∈ S] ≤ ekε ·P[M(D ′) ∈ S]+ ekε − 1
eε − 1 · δ.
All of the upper and lower bounds for one-way marginals have a multiplicative 1/αε de-
pendence on the accuracy α and the privacy loss ε. This is no coincidence - there is a generic
reduction:
Fact 2.3 (α and ε dependence). Let p ∈ [1,∞] and α,ε,δ ∈ [0,1/10].
Suppose there exists a (ε,δ)-differentially private mechanism M : {±1}n×d → [±1]d such that for
every database D ∈ {±1}n×d ,
E
M
[
‖M(D)−D‖p
]
≤ αd1/p.
Then there exists a (1,δ/ε)-differentially private mechanism M ′ : {±1}n′×d → [±1]d for n′ =
Θ(αεn) such that for every database D ′ ∈ {±1}n′×d ,
E
M ′
[
‖M ′(D ′)−D ′‖p
]
≤ d1/p/10.
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This fact allows us to suppress the accuracy parameter α and the privacy loss ε when prov-
ing our lower bounds. Namely, if we prove a lower bound of n′ ≥ n∗ for all (1,δ)-differentially
private mechanisms M ′ : {±1}n′×d → [±1]d with E
M ′
[
‖M ′(D ′)−D ′‖p
]
≤ d1/p/10, then we obtain
a lower bound of n ≥ Ω(n∗/αε) for all (ε,εδ)-differentially private mechanisms M : {±1}n×d →
[±1]d with E
M
[
‖M(D)−D‖p
]
≤ αd1/p. So we will simply fix the parameters α = 1/10 and ε = 1 in
our lower bounds.
3 Lower Bounds for Approximate Differential Privacy
Our main theorem can be stated as follows.
Theorem 3.1 (Main Theorem). Let M : {±1}n×d → [±1]d be a (1,δ)-differentially private mecha-
nism that answers one-way marginals such that
∀D ∈ {±1}n×d E
M
[∣∣∣∣∣∣M(D)−D∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
]
≤ d
10
,
where D is the true answer vector. If 2−Ω(n) ≤ δ ≤ 1/n1+Ω(1) and n is sufficiently large, then
d ≤O
(
n2
log(1/δ)
)
.
Theorem 1.1 in the introduction follows by rearranging terms, and applying Fact 2.3. The
statement above is more convenient technically, but the statement in the introduction is more
consistent with the literature.
First we must introduce fingerprinting codes. The following definition is tailored to the ap-
plication to privacy. Fingerprinting codes were originally defined by Boneh and Shaw [BS98]
with a worst-case accuracy guarantee. Subsequent works [BUV14, SU14] have altered the ac-
curacy guarantee to an average-case one, which we use here.
Definition 3.2 (L1 Fingerprinting Code). A ε-complete δ-sound α-robust L1 fingerprinting code
for n users with length d is a pair of random variables D ∈ {±1}n×d and Trace : [±1]d → 2[n] such
that the following hold.
Completeness: For any fixed M : {±1}n×d → [±1]d ,
P
[(∣∣∣∣∣∣M(D)−D∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤ αd
)
∧ (Trace(M(D)) = ∅)
]
≤ ε.
Soundness: For any i ∈ [n] and fixed M : {±1}n×d → [±1]d ,
P [i ∈ Trace(M(D−i))] ≤ δ,
where D−i denotes D with the ith row replaced by some fixed element of {±1}d .
Fingerprinting codes with optimal length were first constructed by Tardos [Tar08] (for
worst-case error) and subsequent works [BUV14, SU14] have adapted Tardos’ construction to
work for average-case error guarantees, which yields the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.3. For every n ≥ 1, δ > 0, and d ≥ dn,δ = O(n2 log(1/δ)), there exists a 1/100-complete
δ-sound 1/8-robust L1 fingerprinting code for n users with length d.
We now show how the existence of fingerprinting codes implies our lower bound.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 from Theorem 3.3. Let M : {±1}n×d → [±1]d be a (1,δ)-differentially private
mechanism such that
∀D ∈ {±1}n×d E
M
[∣∣∣∣∣∣M(D)−D∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
]
≤ d
10
.
Then, by Markov’s inequality,
∀D ∈ {±1}n×d P
M
[∣∣∣∣∣∣M(D)−D∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
>
d
9
]
≤ 9
10
. (2)
Let k be a parameter to be chosen later. Let nk = bn/kc. Let Mk : {±1}nk×d → [±1]d be the
following mechanism. On input D∗ ∈ {±1}nk×d , Mk creates D ∈ {±1}n×d by taking k copies of D∗
and filling the remaining entries with 1s. Then Mk runs M on D and outputs M(D).
By group privacy (Fact 2.2),Mk is a
(
εk = k,δk =
ek−1
e−1 δ
)
-differentially private mechanism. By
the triangle inequality, ∣∣∣∣∣∣Mk(D∗)−D∗∣∣∣∣∣∣1 ≤ ∣∣∣∣∣∣M(D)−D∣∣∣∣∣∣1 + ∣∣∣∣∣∣D −D∗∣∣∣∣∣∣1 . (3)
Now
Dj =
k ·nk
n
D∗j +
n− k ·nk
n
1.
Thus ∣∣∣∣Dj −D∗j ∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
k ·nk
n
− 1
)
D∗j +
n− k ·nk
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = n− k ·nkn ∣∣∣∣1−D∗j ∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2n− k ·nkn .
We have
n− k ·nk
n
=
n− kbn/kc
n
≤ n− k(n/k − 1)
n
=
k
n
.
Thus
∣∣∣∣∣∣D −D∗∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤ 2k/n. Assume k ≤ n/200. Thus ∣∣∣∣∣∣D −D∗∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤ d/100 and, by (2) and (3),
P
Mk
[∣∣∣∣∣∣Mk(D∗)−D∗∣∣∣∣∣∣1 > d8
]
≤ P
M
[∣∣∣∣∣∣M(D)−D∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
>
d
9
]
≤ 9
10
. (4)
Assume d ≥ dnk ,δ, were dnk ,δ = O(n2k log(1/δ)) is as in Theorem 3.3. We will show by contra-
diction that this cannot be – that is d ≤O(n2k log(1/δ)). LetD∗ ∈ {±1}nk×d and Trace : [±1]d → 2[nk]
be a 1/100-complete δ-sound 1/8-robust L1 fingerprinting code for nk users of length d.
By the completeness of the fingerprinting code,
P
[∣∣∣∣∣∣Mk(D∗)−D∗∣∣∣∣∣∣1 ≤ d8 ∧Trace(M(D)) = ∅
]
≤ 1
100
. (5)
Combinging (4) and (5), gives
P [Trace(Mk(D
∗)) , ∅] ≥ 9
100
>
1
12
.
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In particular, there exists i∗ ∈ [nk] such that
P [i∗ ∈ Trace(Mk(D∗))] > 112nk . (6)
We have that Trace(Mk(D∗)) is a (εk ,δk)-differentially private function of D∗, as it is only
postprocessing Mk(D∗). Thus
P [i∗ ∈ Trace(Mk(D∗))] ≤ eεkP
[
i∗ ∈ Trace(Mk(D∗−i∗))
]
+ δk ≤ eεkδ+ δk , (7)
where the second inequality follows from the soundness of the fingerprinting code.
Combining (6) and (7) gives
1
12nk
≤ eεkδ+ δk = ekδ+ e
k − 1
e − 1 δ =
ek+1 − 1
e − 1 δ < e
k+1δ. (8)
If k ≤ log(1/12nkδ) − 1, then (8) gives a contradiction. Let k = blog(1/12nδ) − 1c. Assuming
δ ≥ e−n/200 ensures k ≤ n/200, as required. Assuming δ ≤ 1/n1+γ implies k ≥ log(1/δ)/(1+1/γ)−
5 ≥Ω(log(1/δ)). This setting of k gives a contradiction, which implies that
d < dnk ,δ =O(n
2
k log(1/δ)) =O
(
n2
k2
log(1/δ)
)
=O
(
n2
log(1/δ)
)
,
as required.
4 New Mechanisms for L∞ Error
Adding independent noise seems very natural for one-way marginals, but it is suboptimal if
one is interested in worst-case (i.e. L∞) error bounds, rather than average-case (i.e. L1) error
bounds.
4.1 Pure Differential Privacy
Theorem 1.2 follows from Theorem 4.1. In particular, the mechanism M : {±1}n×d → [±1]d in
Theorem 1.2 is given by M(D) = D + Y , where Y ∼ D and D is the distribution from Theorem
4.1 with ∆ = 2/n.3
Theorem 4.1. For all ε > 0, d ≥ 1, and ∆ > 0, there exists a continuous distribution D on Rd with
the following properties.
• Privacy: If x,x′ ∈Rd with ||x − x′ ||∞ ≤ ∆, then
P
Y∼D [x+Y ∈ S] ≤ e
ε P
Y∼D
[
x′ +Y ∈ S]
for all measurable S ⊆Rd .
3Note that we must truncate the output of M to ensure that M(D) is always in [±1]d .
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• Accuracy: For all α > 0,
P
Y∼D [||Y ||∞ ≥ α] ≤
(
∆d
εα
)d
ed−αε/∆.
In particular, if d ≤ εα/2∆, then P
Y∼D [||Y ||∞ ≥ α] ≤ (2e)
−d .
• Efficiency: D can be efficiently sampled.
Proof. The distribution D is simply an instantiation of the exponential mechanism [MT07]. In
particular, the probability density function is given by
pdfD(y) ∝ exp
(
− ε
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣y∣∣∣∣∣∣∞) .
Formally, for every measurable S ⊆Rd ,
P
Y∼D [Y ∈ S] =
∫
S
exp
(
− ε∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣y∣∣∣∣∣∣∞)dy∫
Rd
exp
(
− ε∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣y∣∣∣∣∣∣∞)dy .
Firstly, this is clearly a well-defined distribution as long as ε/∆ > 0.
Privacy is easy to verify: It suffices to bound the ratio of the probability densities for the
shifted distributions. For x,x′ ∈Rd with ||x′ − x||∞ ≤ ∆, by the triangle inequality,
pdfD(x+ y)
pdfD(x′ + y)
=
exp
(
− ε∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣x+ y∣∣∣∣∣∣∞)
exp
(
− ε∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣x′ + y∣∣∣∣∣∣∞) = exp
( ε
∆
(∣∣∣∣∣∣x′ + y∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ − ∣∣∣∣∣∣x+ y∣∣∣∣∣∣∞)) ≤ exp( ε∆ ∣∣∣∣∣∣x′ − x∣∣∣∣∣∣∞) ≤ eε.
Define a distribution D∗ on [0,∞) to by Z ∼ D∗ meaning Z = ||Y ||∞ for Y ∼ D. To prove
accuracy, we must give a tail bound on D∗. The probability density function of D∗ is given by
pdfD∗(z) ∝ zd−1 · exp
(
− ε
∆
z
)
,
which is obtained by integrating the probability density function of D over the infinity-ball of
radius z, which has surface area d2dzd−1 ∝ zd−1. Thus D∗ is precisely the gamma distribution
with shape d and mean d∆/ε. The moment generating function is therefore
E
Z∼D∗
[
etZ
]
=
(
1− ∆
ε
t
)−d
for all t < ε/∆. By Markov’s inequality
P
Z∼D∗ [Z ≥ α] ≤
E
Z∼D∗
[
etZ
]
etα
=
(
1− ∆
ε
t
)−d
e−tα .
Setting t = ε/∆− d/α gives the required bound.
It is easy to verify that Y ∼ D can be sampled by first sampling a radius R from a gamma
distribution with shape d + 1 and mean (d + 1)∆/ε and then sampling Y ∈ [±R]d uniformly
at random. To sample R we can set R = ∆ε
∑d
i=0 logUi , where each Ui ∈ (0,1] is uniform and
independent. This gives an algorithm (in the form of an explicit circuit) to sample D that uses
onlyO(d) real arithmetic operations, d+1 logarithms, and 2d+1 independent uniform samples
from [0,1].
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4.2 Approximate Differential Privacy
Our algorithm for approximate differential privacy makes use of a powerful tool from the
literature [DNR+09, HR10, DNPR10, RR10] called the sparse vector algorithm:
Theorem 4.2 (Sparse Vector). For every c,k ≥ 1, ε,δ,α,β > 0, and
n ≥O
√c log(1/δ) log(k/β)αε
 ,
there exists a mechanism SV with the following properties.
• SV takes as input a database D ∈ X n and provides answers a1, · · · , ak ∈ [±1] to k (adaptive)
linear queries q1, · · · ,qk : X → [±1].
• SV is (ε,δ)-differentially private.
• Assuming ∣∣∣∣{j ∈ [k] : |qj(D)| > α/2}∣∣∣∣ ≤ c,
we have
P
SV
[
∀j ∈ [k] |aj − qj(D)| ≤ α
]
≥ 1− β.
A proof of this theorem can be found in [DR13, Theorem 3.28].4 We now describe our
approximately differentially private mechanism.
Parameters: ε,δ > 0.
Input: D ∈ {±1}n×d .
Let
σ = 5
√
d log(1/δ)/εn α = 8σ
√
loglogd
For j ∈ [d], let a˜j =Dj + zj where zj ∼N (0,σ2).
Instantiate SV from Theorem 4.2 with parameters
cSV = 2d/ log
8d kSV = d εSV = ε/2 δSV = δ/2
αSV = α/2 βSV = e
− log4 d
For j ∈ [d], define qj : {±1}d → [±1] by qj(x) = (xj − a˜j )/2.
Let aˆ1, · · · , aˆd be the answers to q1, · · · ,qd given by SV.
For j ∈ [d], let aj = a˜j + 2aˆj .
Output a1, · · · , ad .
Figure 2: Approximately DP mechanism M : {±1}n×d → [±1]d
4Note that the algorithms in the literature are designed to sometimes output ⊥ as an answer or halt prematurely.
To modify these algorithms into the form given by Theorem 4.2 simply output 0 in these cases.
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Proof of Theorem 1.3. Firstly, we consider the privacy of M: a˜ is the output of the Gaussian
mechanism with parameters to ensure that it is a (ε/2,δ/2)-differentially private function of D.
Likewise aˆ is the output of SV with parameters to ensure that it is also a (ε/2,δ/2)-differentially
private function of D. Since the output is a˜ + 2aˆ, composition implies that M as a whole is
(ε,δ)-differentially private, as required.
Now we must prove accuracy. Suppose that |aˆj − qj(D)| ≤ αSV = α/2 for all j ∈ [d]. Then
|aj −Dj | =|a˜j + 2aˆj −Dj |
=|a˜j −Dj + 2(qj(D) + (aˆj − qj(D)))|
≤|a˜j −Dj + 2qj(D)|+ 2|aˆj − qj(D))|
≤|a˜j −Dj + (D − a˜j )|+ 2αSV
=α,
as required. So we need only show that |aˆj − qj(D)| ≤ αSV for all j ∈ [d], which sparse vector
guarantees will happen with probability at least 1− βSV as long as∣∣∣∣{j ∈ [d] : |qj(D)| > αSV/2}∣∣∣∣ ≤ cSV. (9)
Now we verify that (9) holds with high probability.
By our setting of parameters, we have qj(D) = −zj /2. This means
P
[
|qj(D)| > αSV/2
]
= P
[
|zj | > α/2
]
≤ e−α2/8σ2 = 1
log8d
.
Let Ej ∈ {0,1} be the indicator of the event |qj(D)| > αSV/2. Since the zjs are independent, so are
the Ejs. Thus we can apply a Chernoff bound:
P
[∣∣∣∣{j ∈ [d] : |qj(D)| > αSV/2}∣∣∣∣ > cSV] = P
∑
j∈[d]
Ej >
2d
log8d
 ≤ e−2d/ log16 d . (10)
The failure probability of M is bounded by the failure probability of SV plus (10), which is
dominated by βSV = exp(− log4d).
Finally we consider the sample complexity. The accuracy is bounded by
α ≤ 40
√
d · log(1/δ) · loglogd
εn
,
which rearranges to
n ≥ 40
√
d · log(1/δ) · loglogd
αε
.
Theorem 4.2 requires
n ≥O
√cSV log(1/δ) log(d/βSV)αε
 =O√d log(1/δ)αε

for sparse vector to work, which is also satisfied.
We remark that we have not attempted to optimize the constant factors in this analysis.
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A Alternative Lower Bound for Pure Differential Privacy
It is known [HT10] that any ε-differentially private mechanism that answers d one-way marginals
requires n ≥Ω(d/ε) samples. Our techniques yield an alternative simple proof of this fact.
Theorem A.1. Let M : {±1}n×d → [±1]d be a ε-differentially private mechanism. Suppose
∀D ∈ {±1}n×d E
M
[∣∣∣∣∣∣M(D)−D∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
]
≤ 0.9d
Then n ≥Ω(d/ε).
The proof uses a special case of Hoeffding’s Inequality:
Lemma A.2 (Hoeffding’s Inequality). Let X ∈ {±1}n be uniformly random and a ∈Rn fixed. Then
P
X
[〈a,X〉 > λ ||a||2] ≤ e−λ2/2
for all λ ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem A.1. Let x,x′ ∈ {±1}d be independent and uniform. Let D ∈ {±1}n×d be n copies
of x and, likewise, let D ′ ∈ {±1}n×d be n copies of x′. Let Z = 〈M(D),x〉 and Z ′ = 〈M(D ′),x〉.
Now we give conflicting tail bounds for Z and Z ′, which we can relate by privacy.
By our hypothesis and Markov’s inequality,
P [Z ≤ d/20] =P [〈M(D),x〉 ≤ 0.05d]
=P
[
〈D,x〉 − 〈D −M(D),x〉 ≤ 0.05d
]
=P
[
〈D −M(D),x〉 ≥ 0.95d
]
≤P
[∣∣∣∣∣∣D −M(D)∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≥ 0.95d
]
≤
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣D −M(D)∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
]
0.95d
≤ 0.9
0.95
< 0.95.
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Since M(D ′) is independent from x, we have
∀λ ≥ 0 P
[
Z ′ > λ
√
d
]
≤ P
[
〈M(D ′),x〉 > λ ∣∣∣∣∣∣M(D ′)∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
]
≤ e−λ2/2,
by Lemma A.2. In particular, setting λ =
√
d/20 gives P [Z ′ > d/20] ≤ e−d/800.
Now D and D ′ are databases that differ in n rows, so privacy implies that
P [M(D) ∈ S] ≤ enεP[M(D ′) ∈ S]
for all S. Thus
1
20
< P
[
Z >
d
20
]
= P [M(D) ∈ Sx] ≤ enεP[M(D ′) ∈ Sx] = enεP[Z ′ > d20
]
≤ enεe−d/800,
where
Sx =
{
y ∈ [±1]d : 〈y,x〉 > d
20
}
.
Rearranging 1/20 < enεe−d/800, gives
n >
d
800ε
− log(20)
ε
,
as required.
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